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Abstract
Humans cannot help but attribute human emotions to non-human animals. Although such attributions are often regarded
as gratuitous anthropomorphisms and held apart from the attributions humans make about each other’s internal states,
they may be the product of a general mechanism for flexibly interpreting adaptive behavior. To examine this, we used func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in humans to compare the neural mechanisms associated with attributing emo-
tions to humans and non-human animal behavior. Although undergoing fMRI, participants first passively observed the
facial displays of human, non-human primate and domestic dogs, and subsequently judged the acceptability of emotional
(e.g. ‘annoyed’) and facial descriptions (e.g. ‘baring teeth’) for the same images. For all targets, emotion attributions selec-
tively activated regions in prefrontal and anterior temporal cortices associated with causal explanation in prior studies.
These regions were similarly activated by both human and non-human targets even during the passive observation task;
moreover, the degree of neural similarity was dependent on participants’ self-reported beliefs in the mental capacities of
non-human animals. These results encourage a non-anthropocentric view of emotion understanding, one that treats the
idea that animals have emotions as no more gratuitous than the idea that humans other than ourselves do.
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Introduction
‘But man himself cannot express love and humility by external
signs, so plain as does a dog, when with drooping ears, hanging
lips, flexuous body, and wagging tail, he meets his beloved master.
Nor can these movements in the dog be explained by acts of voli-
tion or necessary instincts, any more than the beaming eyes and
smiling cheeks of a man when he meets an old friend.’ (Darwin,
1872: 10–1)
In this brief passage from his treatise ‘The Expression of the
Emotions in Man and Animals, Charles Darwin provides an excellent
illustration of the human mind’s capacity to see in the behavior of
non-human animals the same kinds of covert emotional states it
sees in the behavior of other humans. From an anthropocentric
viewpoint, the attribution of humanlike emotion to non-human
animals represents a clear case of ‘anthropomorphism’, the pro-
jection of our own attributes onto non-human entities (Epley et al.,
2007), and is not unlike the attribution of beliefs, motives and
intentions to other non-human entities, such as moving circles
and triangles (Heider and Simmel, 1944), robots (Fussell et al.,
2008) and hurricanes (Barker and Miller, 1990). Unsurprisingly,
then, Darwin’s sophisticated attributions of emotion to non-
human animals are still the subject of intense debate regarding
whether and how emotion should be used in the science of ani-
mal behavior (de Waal, 2011). Nevertheless, be the beloved family
dog or the genetically similar chimpanzee and bonobo, humans
cannot help but attribute human emotions to animals. In this
study, we designed a behavioral task for isolating the cognitive
processes that produce reliable attributions of emotional states to
the behavior of non-human animals. Using this task in conjunc-
tion with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we for
the first time directly compared the neural basis of attributing the
same emotions to human and non-human animals.
What is involved when one human attributes an emotion to
another human? Taking Darwin’s example above, the target’s
overt facial behaviors (e.g. ‘beaming eyes’, ‘smiling cheeks’) are
viewed as expressions of a specific covert emotional state
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presumed to exist in the target. This assumption—that observ-
able behaviors are caused by unobservable states of mind like
belief and emotion—is the foundation of what the philosopher
Daniel Dennett termed ‘the intentional stance’ (Dennett, 1989),
and what in psychology and more recently social neuroscience
has come to be known as a ‘theory of mind’ (ToM) (Gallagher
and Frith, 2003; Saxe et al., 2004). Our proclivity for making such
attributions about behavior has been well studied by social and
developmental psychologists, yielding several frameworks for
characterizing the dimensions on which we make such attribu-
tions. For instance, there are 2D schemes for experience and
agency (Gray et al., 2007), or for competence and warmth (Fiske
et al., 2007). Specifically for faces, there may be dimensions of
trustworthiness and dominance (Todorov et al., 2008). In all
these cases, the dimensions on which we represent emotion in
humans are dimensions of attributes that cannot be directly
observed but are inferred based on information that is already
known or directly observable, such as non-verbal behavior. In
other words, representations of emotion tend to be conceptually
abstract, with an unreliable correspondence with specific sen-
sorimotor events (Vallacher and Wegner, 1987; Spunt et al.,
2016).
There is also a literature suggesting that very similar, or
identical, psychological dimensions characterize the attribu-
tions humans tend to make about a variety of non-human enti-
ties, ranging from non-human animals to robots to Gods (Epley
et al., 2007). Although such anthropomorphic attributions are
typically placed in a special category and often treated as irra-
tional and gratuitous (e.g. Wynne, 2004), they may actually be
the rational consequence of fundamental similarities in both
the form and function of human and non-human animal
behaviors (de Waal, 2011). The form of the human body and
face—including its capacity for expression—has much in com-
mon with other mammalian species (Brecht and Freiwald,
2012), particularly other primates (Sherwood et al., 2003; Parr
et al., 2007). Not surprisingly, then, untrained human observers
evidence an ability to extract affective information from novel
dog facial expressions that rivals their ability to do the same for
human infant expressions (Schirmer et al., 2013). In turn, evi-
dence suggests that domesticated dogs have through selective
breeding and adaptation to human ecologies evolved an ability
to discriminate affective information in human faces (Berns
et al., 2012; Axelsson et al., 2013; Cuaya et al., 2016).
To our knowledge, no prior neuroimaging study has experi-
mentally manipulated the demand to attribute emotions to
non-human animals in order to identify its neural basis and
evaluate its similarity to the well-known neural basis of reason-
ing about the mental states of another human being. Several
studies have compared the neural correlates of passively
observing dogs and humans under different conditions; these
studies largely demonstrate that regions associated with proc-
essing salient features of human behavior—such as facial
expression and biological motion—are also activated when
observing corresponding features in dogs (Blonder et al., 2004;
Franklin et al., 2013). These studies collectively indicate that
humans spontaneously deploy similar higher-level visual proc-
esses across human and non-human animal targets. However,
given that they did not experimentally control the demand to
anthropmorphize the non-human animal targets, their findings
leave open questions regarding its neural basis.
A related line of prior neuroimaging studies demonstrate
that individual differences in prior experience and beliefs
related to non-human animals affect the brain regions humans
recruit when observing non-human animals. For instance, prior
experience with dogs was associated with increased activity in
the posterior superior temporal sulcus during the passive view-
ing of meaningful dog gestures (Kujala et al., 2012), presumably
reflecting increased engagement of cortical regions concerned
with processing biological motion. A more recent study com-
pared the neural response to observing domesticated dogs in
pet owners and non-pet owners and found that pet owners
more strongly activated a set of cortical regions spanning insu-
lar, frontal, and occipital cortices (Hayama et al., 2016). Related
work examining brain structure suggests that individual differ-
ences in anthropomorphism for non-human animals (see
Waytz et al., 2010) correlated with gray matter volume in a
region of left TPJ thought to be involved in aspects of ToM
(Cullen et al., 2014). These studies suggest the importance of dis-
tinguishing the ‘capacity’ to appreciate anthropomorphic
descriptions of non-human animals, and the ‘tendency’ to deploy
that capacity spontaneously, in the absence of an explicit stim-
ulus to do so (Keysers and Gazzola, 2014).
Although the neural basis of attributing emotion to animals
remains unknown, the neural basis of attributing mental states
to other humans is known to be reliably associated with a set of
cortical regions commonly referred to as the ToM or mentaliz-
ing network (Fletcher et al., 1995; Goel et al., 1995; Happe´ et al.,
1996; Gallagher and Frith, 2003; Saxe et al., 2004; Amodio and
Frith, 2006). In a series of prior studies of healthy adults, we
have shown that attributions about social situations activate an
anatomically well-defined network of brain regions (Spunt et al.,
2010, 2011; Spunt and Lieberman, 2012a,b). In a recent study, we
found that, remarkably, this same neural system appears to be
engaged when we make causal attributions about completely
non-social events, such as attributing the sight of water gushing
out of a gutter to an unseen rainstorm (Spunt and Adolphs,
2015). In line with prior neuroimaging studies of social and/or
non-social reasoning (see Van Overwalle, 2011), activation of
this inferential process was reliably stronger for social situa-
tions. Thus, it appears that social attributions are executed by
processes that, though intrinsically domain-general, may
acquire specialization for the social domain over the course of
social development.
Here, we extend this research to identify the neural mecha-
nisms supporting anthropomorphism during the perception of
facial expressions that we see in non-human primates and
dogs. Specifically, we examined three questions. First, do we
use the same mechanisms to attribute emotions to the facial
expressions of humans and non-human animals, when asked
in a task to make such attributions? Second, do we spontane-
ously recruit these mechanisms to similar degrees when merely
passively watching human and non-human animal behavior, in
the absence of an explicit attribution task? Third, is the level of
spontaneous recruitment dependent on individual differences




Eighteen adults from the Los Angeles metropolitan area partici-
pated in the study in exchange for financial compensation. All
participants were screened to ensure that they were right-
handed, neurologically and psychiatrically healthy, had normal
or corrected-to-normal vision, spoke English fluently, had IQ in
the normal range (as assessed using the Wechsler Abbreviated
Scales of Intelligence), and were not pregnant or taking any
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psychotropic medications at the time of the study. All partici-
pants provided written informed consent according to a proto-
col approved by the Institutional Review Board of the California
Institute of Technology.
Exclusions. For the Explicit Task described below, data from
two participants was excluded from the analysis, one due to
unusually poor task performance (no response to 46% of trials),
and one due to excessive head motion during image acquisition
(translation > 8 mm). This left 16 participants (8 males, 8
females; mean age ¼ 29.00, age range ¼ 21–46) for the analysis
of the Explicit Task. For the Implicit Task described below, data
from one participant were excluded from analysis due to
unusually poor task performance (no response to 42% of catch
trials). This left 17 participants (9 males, 8 females; mean age ¼
28.71, age range ¼ 21–46) in the analysis of the Implicit Task.
Power analysis. The open-source MATLAB toolbox fmripower
was used to estimate power for detecting effects in the
‘Emotion > Expression’ contrast for each of the a priori ROIs
used to test our primary hypotheses in the Explicit Task
(described below). We used the ‘Mind > Body> contrast from
Spunt et al. (2015), which featured an event-related design simi-
lar to that of this study. For the four ROIs used to test our pri-
mary hypotheses, 90% detection power could be achieved with
an average of 9.25 subjects (SD ¼ 3.95, MIN/MAX ¼ 6/15). We
thus aimed to have data from at least 15 subjects, a sample size
sufficiently large to test our primary hypotheses, and recruited
n ¼ 18 with the expectation that a few participants might drop
out for technical reasons, as indeed a few did.
Experimental design
For the study, participants were asked to perform two tasks,
each of which was intended to capture distinctive features of
emotion attribution. Both tasks featured the same stimulus set
containing photographs of human, non-human primate, and
dog facial expressions. The tasks differed primarily in the overt
task that participants had to perform for each stimulus. In the
following sections, we describe in detail the components of the
experimental design, beginning with the stimulus set.
Stimuli. The experimental stimuli were composed of 30 natu-
ralistic photographs of facial expressions from each of three cat-
egories: ‘Humans, Non-human Primates and Dogs’ (see Figure 1
e.g. and Supplementary Figure S1–S3 for the full stimulus sets).
For brevity’s sake, we henceforth use the term ‘Primate’ to refer
to the Non-human Primate photographs. Given that three of the
Primate photographs show the animal in restricted conditions
(e.g. behind the bars of a cage), we clarify here that we describe
the photographs as ‘naturalistic’ from the perspective of a
human observer rather than the depicted targets. Insofar as
opportunities for humans to observe primates often occur while
the animal is in captivity (e.g. zoo, laboratory), photographs of
animals in restricted conditions are therefore ‘naturalistic’ from
the perspective of the human observer.
We acquired stimuli from a variety of online stock photogra-
phy sources. Each set contained 26 color photographs and four
grayscale photographs; these were not distinguished in analy-
ses. Moreover, the three sets were matched on valence, on face
area proportionate to the whole image area, and on estimated
luminance (all Ps > 0.84 from independent-samples t-tests com-
paring the means). We used Amazon.com’s web service
Mechanical Turk to collect normative ratings of photograph
valence from 30 native English-speaking US citizens (on a
seven-point Likert scale; 1 ¼ Extremely Negative, 4 ¼ Neutral, 7
¼ Extremely Positive).
Explicit task. In the Explicit Task, we experimentally manipu-
lated mental state attribution by presenting participants with
each stimulus twice, once with the demand to evaluate a
description of the target’s emotional state (e.g. bored?), and
once with the demand to instead evaluate a description of the
physical characteristics of their facial expression (e.g. mouth
open?). The Explicit Task can thus be described as a 2 (Cue:
Emotion vs Expression)  3 (Target: Humans vs Non-human
Primates vs Dogs) factorial design. In numerous published stud-
ies, we have shown that conceptually similar manipulations
provide a contrast that robustly and selectively modulates
activity in the regions of the brain associated with mental state
attribution (Spunt et al., 2011; Spunt and Lieberman, 2012a,b;
Spunt and Adolphs, 2014).
Table 1 displays the 10 verbal cues featured in the study.
Emotion cues regarded the mental state of the focal animal in
the photograph (e.g. bored?), while Expression cues regarded an
observable motor behavior (e.g. gazing up?). Each cue was paired
with four photographs designed to elicit the response ‘yes’, and
two photographs designed to elicit the response ‘no’. These pair-
ings were selected based on the responses of an independent
sample of Mechanical Turk respondents. For these prior norma-
tive responses, each cue-stimulus pairing was evaluated by 30
native English-speaking US citizens. We retained only those pair-
ings that produced the same response (accept or reject) in the
majority (>80%) of respondents. In our subsequent analysis of
participant performance, this consensus data was used to code
responses as normative vs counternormative. Independent sam-
ples t-tests showed that question-photograph consensus did not
differ across the three stimulus sets (Ps > 0.60).
Implicit task. The Explicit Task allowed us to tackle our pri-
mary research question directly: Do people activate the same
neural regions, and hence presumably engage the same psycho-
logical processes, to attribute mental states to the facial expres-
sions of humans and non-human animals alike? Given that
anthropomorphism is motivated by extrinsic task demands,
this limited our ability to address our secondary and tertiary
research questions, which ask whether humans commonly
attribute human-like emotions to non-human animals sponta-
neously, in the absence of any extrinsic demands to do so. To
better capture aspects of this spontaneously expressed motiva-
tion to anthropomorphize non-human animals, we had partici-
pants perform a simple visual one-back task on all stimuli. To
minimize demand characteristics, participants always per-
formed this Implicit Task before being introduced to the Explicit
Task. This ensured that the evoked responses to each stimulus
category were maximally spontaneous and not primed by the
words used in the explicit task.
In the Implicit Task, the 90 stimuli were presented in
pseudo-random order in an event-related fashion along with 30
phase-scrambled images, which were selected by phase-
scrambling the entire set of 90 stimuli and determining a subset
of 30 that was matched on luminance. Each stimulus appeared
onscreen for 2 s. Trials were separated by an inter-stimulus
interval during which a fixation-cross appeared onscreen. The
duration ranged from 0.5 to 5 s, with a mean interval of 1.5 s.
During stimulus presentation, participants were asked to per-
form a visual one-back task, indicating with a right index finger
button press whenever a presented image was the same as the
one previously shown. Three 1-back ‘catch’ trials were included
for each of the four stimulus conditions and excluded from the
fMRI analysis. The percentage of one-backs detected by partici-
pants was high (Mean ¼ 96.57%, Min ¼ 75.00%), ensuring that all
participants attended to the images.
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Post-task stimulus ratings and personality measurement.
Immediately following their scan, all subjects also rated each of
the facial expression images on two scales. To assess the extent
to which participants understood the emotional state of each
target, participants answered the question ‘Do you understand
what he or she is feeling?’ (1–9 scale; 1 ¼ Not at all, 9 ¼
Completely). To assess the valence of the participant’s emo-
tional reaction to viewing each target, participants answered
the question ‘How does the photograph make you feel?’ (1–9
scale; 1 ¼ Very bad, 9 ¼ Very good).
In addition, participants completed several questionnaires
designed to measure personality attributes we predicted would
affect their tendency to anthropomorphize animals. These were
the The Belief in Animal Mind Questionnaire (BAM; Hills, 1995),
the Empathy to Animals Scale (ETA; Paul, 2000), the Pet Attitude
Scale (PAS; Templer et al., 1981), and the Individual Differences
in Anthropomorphism Questionnaire (IDAQ; Waytz et al., 2010).
Due to restriction of range in our small sample in responses to
the BAM, ETA and PAS, we excluded these questionnaires from
further analysis. Moreover, given our exclusive focus on the
anthropomorphization of non-human animals as well as prior
work indicating distinct correlates of the living and non-living
subscales of the IDAQ (Cullen et al., 2014), we restricted our anal-
ysis to the animal anthropomorphization subscale, which dem-
onstrated both excellent internal reliability (a ¼ 0.90) and range
of responses across participants (Scale Limits: 1–9; Score Range:
2.2–9). Due to subject timing schedules, responses to the BAM,
ETA, and IDAQ were available for only 16 participants.
Experimental procedures
For both tasks, trials were presented to participants in a
pseudo-randomized event-related design (Figure 1). For the
Implicit Task, the order and onsets of trials were optimized to
maximize the efficiency of separately estimating the Face >
Scramble contrast for each of the three target categories. For the
Explicit Task, the order and onsets of trials were optimized to
maximize the efficiency of separately estimating the Emotion >
Expression contrast for each of the three targets; in addition,
the order in which the Emotion/Expression cues appeared was
counterbalanced across stimuli within each target. For both
tasks, design optimization was achieved by generating the
design matrices for 1 million pseudo-randomly generated
designs and for each summing the efficiencies of estimating
each contrast of interest. The most efficient design for each task
was retained and used for all participants.
Stimulus presentation and response recording used the
Psychophysics Toolbox (version 3.0.9; Brainard, 1997) operating
in MATLAB. An LCD projector was used to present the task on a
screen at the rear of the scanner bore that was visible to partici-
pants through a mirror positioned on the head coil. Participants
were given a button box and made their responses using their
right-hand index and middle fingers. Before the experimental
tasks, participants were introduced to the task structure and
Fig. 1. Experimental design. (a) In the Implicit Task, participants perform a visual one-back on a series of naturalistic images showing human, non-human primate,
and dog facial displays. Images appear in an event-related design intermixed with a phase-scrambled subset of the same images which provided a baseline for univari-
ate contrasts. We refer to the task as ‘implicit’ only to designate that at the time of performing the task, participants were not explicitly directed to attend to or think
about the images in a particular way, and were naı¨ve to the fact that in a subsequent task they would be asked to consider the emotional states of each target. (b) The
sequence of screens from an example trial in the Explicit Task, which participants learn about only after completing the Implicit Task. The task features the same
images used in the Implicit Task (excluding scrambles). Each image is presented twice, once preceded by a verbal cue directing participants to accept or reject an emo-
tion attribution about the target, and once by a verbal cue directing participants to accept or reject an expression attribution about the target (all verbal cues presented
in Table 1). Once the image appears, participants have 1750 ms to commit a ‘Yes/No’ manual response. Every cue preceded an equal number of images from each target
type and elicited a response of either ‘Yes’ (two-third of trials) or ‘No’ (one-third of trials) in the majority of respondents in an independent sample.
Table 1. Verbal cues used in the Explicit Task to experimentally con-
trol the incidence of emotion attribution when observing the facial





confident? looking at the camera?
excited? mouth closed?
reflective? mouth open?
Emotion cues prompted participants to evaluate the emotional state implied by
the target expression, while Expression cues prompted participants to evaluate
a factual statement about the target expression itself. Each cue was paired with
six targets from each stimulus category. Every target appeared twice during the
Explicit Task, once paired with an Emotion cue and once with a Verbal cue.
Thus, the Emotion > Expression contrast is attentional.
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performed brief practice versions featuring stimuli not included
in the experimental task.
Image acquisition
All imaging data was acquired at the Caltech Brain Imaging
Center using a Siemens Trio 3.0 Tesla MRI scanner outfitted
with a 32 channel phased-array head coil. We acquired 1330
whole-brain T2*-weighted echoplanar image volumes (EPIs;
multi-band acceleration factor ¼ 4, slice thickness ¼ 2.5 mm, in-
plane resolution ¼ 2.5  2.5 mm, 56 slices, TR ¼ 1000 ms, TE ¼
30 ms, flip angle ¼ 60, FOV ¼ 200 mm) for the two experimental
tasks. Participants’ in-scan head motion was minimal (max
translation ¼ 2.78 mm, max rotation ¼ 1.88). We also acquired
an additional 904 EPI volumes for each participant for use in a
separate study. Finally, we acquired a high-resolution anatomi-
cal T1-weighted image (1 mm isotropic) and field maps used to
estimate and correct for inhomogeneity-induced image
distortion.
Image preprocessing
Images were processed using Statistical Parametric Mapping
(SPM12 version 6685, Wellcome Department of Cognitive
Neurology, London, UK) operating in MATLAB. Prior to statistical
analysis, each participant’s images for each task were subjected
to the following preprocessing steps: (i) the first four EPI vol-
umes were discarded to account for T1-equilibration effects; (ii)
slice-timing correction was applied; (iii) the realign and unwarp
procedure was used to perform distortion correction and con-
current motion correction; (iv) the participants’ T1 structural
volume was co-registered to the mean of the corrected EPI vol-
umes; (v) the group-wise DARTEL registration method included
in SPM12 (Ashburner, 2007) was used to normalize the T1 struc-
tural volume to a common group-specific space, with subse-
quent affine registration to Montreal Neurological Institute
(MNI) space; (vi) all EPI volumes were normalized to MNI space
using the deformation flow fields generated in the previous
step, which simultaneously re-sampled volumes (2 mm iso-
tropic) and applied spatial smoothing (Gaussian kernel of 6 mm
isotropic, full width at half maximum); and finally, (vii) a log-
transformation was applied to the EPI timeseries for each task
to ensure that the regression weights estimated from our
single-subject models were interpretable as percent signal
change.
Single-subject analysis
For each participant, general linear models were used to esti-
mate a model of the EPI timeseries for each task. Models for
both tasks included as covariates of no interest the six motion
parameters estimated from image realignment and a predictor
for every timepoint where in-brain global signal change (GSC)
exceeded 2.5 SDs of the mean GSC or where estimated motion
exceeded 0.5 mm of translation or 0.5 of rotation. In addition,
the hemodynamic response was modelled using the canonical
(double-gamma) response function; high-pass filtered at 1/
100 Hz; and estimated using the SPM12 RobustWLS toolbox,
which implements the robust weighted least-squares estima-
tion algorithm (Diedrichsen and Shadmehr, 2005).
Explicit task. The model for the Explicit Task included six
covariates of interest corresponding to the six cells created by
crossing factors corresponding to the Cue (‘Emotion’ vs
‘Expression’) and Target (‘Humans’ vs ‘Non-human Primates’ vs
‘Dogs’). These covariates excluded foil trials (i.e. trials to which
the normative response was to reject) and trials to which the
participant gave either no response or the counternormative
response. These excluded trials were modeled in a separate
covariate of no interest. The neural response to each trial was
defined with variable epochs spanning the onset and offset of
the target stimulus (Grinband et al., 2008). The onset of the ver-
bal cues preceding each target was also modeled in an addi-
tional covariate of no interest. A final covariate of no interest
was included which modeled variability in response time (RT)
across all trials included in the covariates of interest.
Implicit task. The model for the Implicit Task included four
covariates of interest corresponding to the timeseries of the
four stimulus types presented to participants (‘Humans,
Primates, Dogs, Scrambles’). These covariates excluded all one-
back ‘catch’ trials, which were modeled in a separate covariate
of no interest. Given that stimulus duration was fixed across
conditions, we modeled the neural response to each trial using
fixed 2-second epochs that spanned the onset and offset of
each image.
Group analysis
Contrasts of interest. To test for a relationship with emotion attri-
bution across all three targets (humans, primates, dogs), we
used paired-samples t-tests to identify those regions that inde-
pendently demonstrated an association with the Emotion >
Expression contrast in the Explicit Task for all three targets. We
followed this by testing for target-independent (spontaneous)
responses to the Face > Scramble contrast in the Implicit Task
for each stimulus category separately.
We interrogated several additional contrasts to identify
effects that reliably differed across the human and non-human
targets. Our primary objective here was to identify those effects
where Human targets differed from both Primate and Dog tar-
gets. For the Explicit Task, we examined two contrasts, one for
the Cue by Target interaction (‘HumanEmotion>Expression > Non-
humanEmotion> Expression’); and one for the main effect of Target
(‘HumanEmotionþ Expression>Non-humanEmotionþExpression’). For
the Implicit Task, we examined the ‘Human>Non-human’
comparison. Finally, exploratory analyses of the ‘Primate > Dog’
comparison are reported in Supplementary Table S2. These
analyses indicate that in both the Explicit and Implicit Tasks,
responses in regions of interest were not reliably different
across the two non-human targets.
Regions of interest. Each effect of interest was first interro-
gated using a set of independently defined ROI based on the
group-level Why/How contrasts from Study 1 (n ¼ 29) and Study
3 (n ¼ 21) reported in Spunt and Adolphs (2014). These images
are publicly available on NeuroVault (http://neurovault.org/col
lections/445/). In Spunt and Adolphs (2015), we observed evi-
dence for domain-general responses to the Why > How contrast
in four left hemisphere ROIs: Dorsomedial PFC, the Lateral OFC,
TPJ and Anterior STS. Two of these regions—the dorsomedial
PFC and lateral OFC—showed a response to the Why > How
contrast that was reliably stronger for facial expressions than
for non-social events. Building on these prior study findings,
our ROI analyses here were focused on the same four ROIs high-
lighted in that prior study. The peak coordinate and spatial
extent of each ROI is provided in Supplementary Table S1. For
each ROI, we tested our hypotheses with t-tests on the extracted
average parameter estimate across voxels. For each test, we
report P-values corrected for multiple comparisons across ROIs
using the false-discovery rate (FDR) procedure described in
Benjamini and Yekutieli (2001). Confidence intervals (CIs) for
R. P. Spunt et al. | 99
these effects were estimated using the bias corrected and accel-
erated percentile method (10 000 random samples with replace-
ment; implemented using the BOOTCI function in MATLAB).
Whole-brain. ROI analyses were complemented by whole-
brain analyses. To model the 2  3 design of the Explicit Task at
the group-level, we entered participants’ contrast images for
the six cells of the design into a random-effects analysis using
the flexible factorial repeated-measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA) module within SPM12 (within-subject factors: Cue,
Target; blocking factor: Subject). To examine the one-way
design of the Implicit Task, we conducted one-sample t-tests on
single-subject contrast images for effects of interest. When
interrogating the group-level model for both tasks, we tested
the conjunction null for comparisons of interest using the mini-
mum statistic method (Nichols et al., 2005).
We interrogated the resulting group-level t-statistic images
by applying a cluster-forming (voxel-level) threshold of P <
0.001 followed by cluster-level correction for multiple compari-
sons at a family-wise error (FWE) of 0.05. Cluster-level correc-
tion was achieved for conjunction images by identifying the
maximum cluster extent threshold necessary to achieve
cluster-wise correction across the individual images entering
the conjunction. For visual presentation, thresholded t-statistic
maps were overlaid on the average of the participants’ T1-
weighted anatomical images.
Exploratory analysis of individual differences. We conducted
between-subject analyses to explore possible individual differ-
ences in the experimentally unconstrained brain activity
observed during the Implicit Task. We specifically explored two
interrelated a priori hypotheses regarding individual differences
in the attribution of human-like emotions to non-human ani-
mals. The first hypothesis follows on our finding that brain
regions associated with anthropomorphism in the Explicit Task
were reliably activated by the stimuli in the Implicit Task. If
these activations reflect spontaneous anthropomorphism, then
they should be strongest in those individuals who, on our post-
scanning questionnaire, endorsed the highest levels of under-
standing the animal stimuli, as well as in those participants
who endorsed a disposition to anthropomorphize non-human
animals in their everyday lives. To explore this first hypothesis,
we extracted signal from each ROI in the Primate > Scramble
and Dog > Scramble contrasts and computed the Pearson corre-
lation with the scores derived from the post-task stimulus rat-
ings and personality questionnaires.
The second hypothesis adopts a different approach to
interpreting the activity observed in the Implicit Task. Namely,
if spontaneous activity in response to non-human animals
reflects anthropomorphism, then the extent to which that
activity is similar to the same individual’s spontaneous activ-
ity in response to humans should be associated with their ten-
dency to anthropomorphize non-human animals. To explore
this hypothesis, for each participant we correlated their
whole-brain (gray-matter masked) response pattern for
human faces to their response pattern for each of the non-
human animal face conditions. These correlations were com-
puted on the t-statistic images and subsequently Fisher’s
z-transformed for the between-subject analysis. This pro-
duced two measures of human/non-human neural similarity
for each participant, which we also correlated with the scores
derived from the post-task stimulus ratings and personality
questionnaires.
We chose to estimate similarity across the whole-brain
response because it requires no assumptions about the content
of the brain states being compared. Rather, it simply asks to
what extent to a participant responds similarly when naturally
observing humans and non-human animals, and is agnostic
regarding ‘what’ specific mental contents and processes are
involved. In adopting this strategy, we recognized that within-
subject similarities would likely be underestimated due to the
admission of functional responses that are irrelevant to anthro-
pomorphism, such as early visual processing. However, we rea-
soned that this problem in within-subject similarity estimates




Table 2 summarizes cue acceptance and RT data from the
Explicit Task and post-task stimulus ratings of emotion under-
standing and emotional valence. Due to ceiling effects on cue
acceptance which produced highly non-normal distributions,
we did not subject cue acceptance data to statistical tests and
excluded counternormative attributions from our analysis of
the both the remaining behavioral outcomes (RT and post-task
ratings) and the estimated neural response (as described in the
‘Methods’ section).
Explicit task performance. We used a series of repeated meas-
ures ANOVA to examine the remaining behavioral outcomes in
the Explicit Task. Complete results are presented in
Supplementary Table S2. When examining the simultaneous
effects of Cue and Target on Acceptance RT, we observed a sig-
nificant main effect of both Cue and Target but no interaction.
The main effect of Cue—namely, that RT to acceptance for
Emotion cues were longer than for Expression cues—parallels a
reliable behavioral effects observed in the Why/How Task from
which this study’s task was adapted (Spunt and Adolphs, 2014,
2015). Critically, the absence of an interaction effect indicates
that this behavioral effect was of a similar magnitude in all
three targets. Post-hoc t-tests indicated that the RT difference
across Emotion and Expression cues revealed reliable above-
zero effects for all three targets (all Ps < 0.0001). We additionally
observed no evidence that the magnitude of this RT effect dif-
fered in any of the pairwise comparisons (all Ps > 0.20). Post-hoc
t-tests demonstrate that the main effect of Target on RT to
acceptance was driven by reliably longer RTs for judgments of
non-human targets when compared with the same judgments
for human targets (all Ps < 0.0001).
We emphasize here our belief that the main effect of Target
on RT does not pose a significant impediment to interpreting
our fMRI-derived measures of brain activity. As described
earlier, our regression model of the fMRI timeseries for the
Explicit Task additionally included a parametric covariate mod-
elling RT variability in response amplitude across all included
trials. As we have shown now in multiple published papers
(Spunt and Adolphs, 2014; Spunt et al., 2016), RT variability does
not sufficiently explain the univariate response in regions asso-
ciated with attentional manipulations akin to the Emotion/
Expression manipulation used here.
Post-task ratings. A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant
main effect of Target on participants’ post-task ratings of emo-
tion understanding. Post-hoc contrasts revealed that this effect
was driven by higher levels of understanding for human targets
compared with each non-human targets, with no reliable differ-
ence across the two non-human targets. Finally, a one-way
ANOVA revealed no evidence for an effect of Target on partic-
ipants’ post-task ratings of valence.
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Target-independent effects
As listed in Table 3 and displayed in Figure 3, every ROI except
the left TPJ showed an independently significant association
with the ‘Emotion > Expression’ contrast for all three targets.
These were the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), the lat-
eral orbitofrontal cortex (LOFC) and the anterior superior tem-
poral sulcus (aSTS). Notably, left TPJ failed to demonstrate an
association with the ‘Emotion > Expression’ contrast for any of
the three targets, including Humans. As displayed in Figure 2a
and listed in Supplementary Table S3, a whole-brain analysis of
the ‘Emotion > Expression’ conjunction across targets demon-
strated target-independent responses in regions of the dmPFC
and LOFC similar in location to our a priori ROIs for those
regions. These findings strongly suggest that explicitly attribut-
ing emotions (as opposed to merely describing expressions) to
non-human animal faces relies on the same core inferential
mechanisms supporting the attribution of emotion to the faces
of other humans.
We next tested for target-general responses in the Implicit
Task. As also listed in Table 3, every ROI—including the left
TPJ—showed an independently significant association with the
comparison to Scrambled images for all three targets. As dis-
played in Figure 2 and listed in Supplementary Table S3, a
whole-brain analysis of the Face > Scramble conjunction across
targets demonstrated target-independent responses in a dis-
tributed set of cortical regions spanning the fusiform and infe-
rior occipital gyri bilaterally, the amygdala/parahippocampal
gyrus bilaterally, the precuneus, and both the vmPFC and
dmPFC. These findings expand on those observed in the Explicit
Task by demonstrating that non-human animal facial expres-
sions elicit similar regional responses in the brain even in the
absence of an explicit emotion attribution task, and that these
regional responses include those associated with emotion attri-
bution in the Explicit Task as well as additional regions associ-
ated more so with face perception and social attention in prior
studies (Blonder et al., 2004; Kujala et al., 2012; Franklin et al.,
2013; Hayama et al., 2016).
Target-dependent effects
As listed in Table 4 and displayed in Figure 4, we observed scant
evidence for univariate responses in any ROI that reliably discri-
minated the human from the non-human stimuli. When exam-
ining each of the direct, pairwise comparisons of the three
targets, only the left aSTS and left TPJ demonstrated reliable
effects. The left aSTS showed greater activation for human
Table 2. Means and SDs (parenthetically) summarizing the frequency and RT with which participants accepted normative Emotion and
Expression cues for each of the three targets in the Explicit Task, as well as their ratings of each stimulus target collected post-task
Acceptance (%) Acceptance RT (ms) Post-task Stimulus Ratings
Emotion Expression Emotion Expression Understanding Valence
Human 97.19 (4.46) 98.12 (3.10) 914 (126) 789 (99) 6.93 (1.03) 5.31 (.48)
Primate 94.95 (5.20) 89.95 (6.82) 960 (112) 849 (108) 5.83 (.91) 5.07 (.62)
Dog 84.80 (12.18) 95.24 (6.98) 948 (114) 848 (94) 6.05 (1.11) 5.30 (.47)
Participants indicated the extent to which they understood what each target was feeling (‘Understanding’), and the extent to which each target made them feel good
versus bad (‘Valence’). See the main text further details and Supplementary Table S2 for statistical analysis of these outcomes.
Fig. 2. Percent signal change in a priori ROIs. For each ROI, the leftmost set of bars represent the mean response across voxels (relative to fixation baseline) to the six
conditions of the Explicit Task; the rightmost set of bars represent the mean response across voxels to each target in the Implicit Task (relative to the response to the
scramble stimulus condition). For further details on the ROIs, see the main text and Supplementary Table S1. Statistical tests corresponding to the data plotted here
are presented in Tables 3 and 4. OFC, orbitofrontal cortex; TPJ, temporoparietal junction; aSTS, anterior superior temporal sulcus; dmPFC, dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex.
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compared with primate faces in both the Explicit and Implicit
Tasks, and for dog compared with primate faces in the Explicit
Task. The left TPJ showed greater activation for human com-
pared with primate faces in only the Explicit Task. Although of
potential interest, these effects are more likely to be interpreted
in terms of factors other than the human vs non-human dis-
tinction, such as prior experience and conceptual familiarity,
which would naturally be elevated for facial expressions of dogs
and humans when compared with non-human primates.
Exploratory analysis of individual differences
Table 5 summarizes the results of exploratory between-subject
analyses examining the relationship between brain activity dur-
ing the Implicit Task and participants’ post-task ratings of emo-
tion understanding and the non-human animal subscale of the
IDAQ. Univariate contrast in our ROIs did not show consistent
effects on ratings of emotion understanding but did show pre-
liminary evidence for a positive association with the IDAQ sub-
scale. Multivariate response similarity across human and each
non-human target revealed stronger evidence for an association
between ‘human-like’ brain activity and both higher levels of
emotion understanding and dispositional anthropomorphism
towards animals.
Discussion
We identified the brain regions underlying a basic form of
anthropomorphism, namely, the attribution of human-like
emotion to the facial expressions of non-human animals. Using
an adapted version of the Yes/No Why/How Task (Spunt and
Adolphs, 2014), we were able to independently identify the neu-
ral basis of attributing the same emotional states to other
humans, to non-human primates, and to dogs. In both region-
of-interest and whole-brain analyses, we found no evidence for
a uniquely human neural substrate for the attribution of emo-
tion. Instead, we found that attributions of emotion to each of
the three targets draw on a shared neural mechanism spanning
dorsomedial and lateral orbitofrontal prefrontal cortices.
Thus, to answer our first research question: ‘Yes’, attribu-
tions of emotion to both humans and to non-human animals
Fig. 3. Whole-brain analysis of target-independent effects. Statistical maps are cluster-level corrected at a FWE rate of 0.05. (a) ‘Explicit Task’. Regions showing signifi-
cantly positive or negative responses in the ‘Emotion > Expression’ contrast for all targets. (b) ‘Implicit Task’. Regions showing a significantly positive response in the
‘Face > Scramble’ contrast for all targets. (c) ‘Explicit/Implicit Task Conjunction’. The region of dorsomedial prefrontal cortex showing a target independent-effect in
both tasks.
Table 3. Outcomes of ROI tests on the within-stimulus comparisons from the Explicit and Implicit Tasks
Contrast Name Humans Non-human Primates Dogs
ROI Label t-stat pFDR 95% CI t-stat pFDR 95% CI t-stat pFDR 95% CI
Explicit Task: Emotion > Expression
LOFC* 5.415 <0.001 0.34 0.68 5.357 <0.001 0.25 0.51 7.531 <0.001 0.41 0.69
TPJ 0.203 1.000 0.17 0.24 1.896 0.161 0.01 0.29 1.958 0.144 0.01 0.30
aSTS 3.532 0.013 0.09 0.31 2.086 0.151 0.00 0.21 3.168 0.018 0.07 0.26
dmPFC* 3.192 0.017 0.13 0.52 5.668 <0.001 0.32 0.63 6.913 <0.001 0.36 0.64
Implicit Task: Face > Scramble
LOFC* 2.911 0.021 0.12 0.51 2.788 0.027 0.11 0.54 2.720 0.032 0.05 0.29
TPJ* 4.171 0.002 0.26 0.68 2.798 0.027 0.10 0.48 2.878 0.030 0.13 0.53
aSTS* 5.777 <0.001 0.20 0.39 3.734 0.008 0.08 0.25 4.821 0.002 0.09 0.21
dmPFC* 5.620 <0.001 0.42 0.86 4.364 0.004 0.35 0.88 2.980 0.030 0.13 0.61
*ROIs that showed an effect across all stimulus categories. P-values after adjusting for multiple ROIs using a FDR procedure. Further details on the ROIs used are pro-
vided in the main text and Supplementary Table S1. L, Left; LOFC, lateral orbitofrontal cortex; TPJ, temporoparietal junction; aSTS, anterior superior temporal sulcus;
dmPFC, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex.
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draw on the same neural mechanism. Rather than viewing this
result as the misapplication of an inferential mechanism for
attributing mental states to other humans, we instead view this
as the rational consequence of fundamental continuities in
both the form and function of human and many non-human
animal behaviors (de Waal, 2011; Brecht and Freiwald, 2012). As
noted earlier, the human body much in common with other
mammalian species, making it natural that many non-human
animals would behave in ways that physically resemble human
emotional behaviors. A distinct yet related view follows from
the observation that, due to common descent and/or to com-
mon ecology, many non-human animal species produce behav-
iors with functions that resemble those ascribed to human
emotional behaviors, for instance, social communication. And,
while it may be the case that we cannot know what it feels like
to be a dog or a chimpanzee, it is just as much the case that we
cannot know what it feels like to be ‘any’ human other than
ourselves.
Our second research question attempted to distinguish the
‘ability’ to attribute emotion to non-human animal behavior
from the ‘tendency’ to recruit that ability spontaneously, in the
absence of the kinds of explicit verbal cues used to manipulate
emotion attribution in the Explicit Task. Thus, before introduc-
ing participants to the Explicit Task, we asked them to observe
the experimental stimuli while performing a minimally
demanding one-back task. In this Implicit Task, we found that
human and non-human facial expressions both elicited activity
in a distributed network of brain regions including those regions
associated with emotion attribution in the subsequent Explicit
Task. Of course, this does not permit the reverse inference that
participants were making emotion attributions while perform-
ing the one-back task. Rather, it reinforces the conclusion that
the similar functional responses observed for human and non-
human targets in the Explicit Task were not merely the product
of the strong demand characteristics imposed by experimental
protocol. Thus, to answer our second research question: ‘Yes’,
when observing non-human animal facial expressions, partici-
pants activate this mechanism spontaneously even in the
absence of explicit verbal cues to attribute emotion.
Our final research question built on extant research demon-
strating that the tendency to attribute emotion to non-human
animals is a measurable trait that shows considerable variabil-
ity in the general population (Waytz et al., 2010). In a set of
exploratory analyses of both univariate contrast in our a priori
ROIs and multivariate response pattern similarity across the
whole-brain, we found evidence consistent with the proposition
that individuals who are more dispositionally prone to attribute
mental states to non-human animals will be more similar in
their neural responses to humans and non–human animals.
Thus, to provide a preliminary answer to our third and final
research question: ‘Yes’, the extent to which humans and non-
human animals spontaneously produce similar neural
responses appears to be somewhat related to individual differ-
ences in beliefs about the mental capacities of non-human ani-
mal species.
Future studies with larger sample sizes should further inves-
tigate individual differences in animal emotion attribution as
they appear in both typically developing populations and in
psychiatric disorders. Such studies would profit by considering
other idiographic variables that influence how individuals per-
ceive and think about non-human animals, such as adhering to
a vegetarian or vegan diet for ethical reasons. Doing so may
shed light on the mechanisms by which human–animal rela-
tionships, in particular, pet ownership, can have positive effects
on mental health and symptom improvement in a wide variety
of disorders (Matchock, 2015).
Finally, it is well known that fMRI can distinguish separable
neural processes, but cannot provide definitive conclusions
regarding similar neural processes. It is thus possible that emo-
tion attribution for human faces, non-human primate faces,
and dog faces, recruit different neural mechanisms. Although
Fig. 4. Whole-brain analysis of target-dependent effects. Statistical maps are cluster-level corrected at a FWE rate of 0.05. (a) ‘Explicit Task’. Regions showing a differen-
tial response to Human targets relative to both Non-human targets (collapsing the ‘Emotion/Expression’ factor). (b) ‘Implicit Task’. Regions showing a differential
response to Human targets relative to both Non-human targets.
Table 4. Outcomes of ROI tests examining contrasts of human to
non-human targets in the Explicit and Implicit Tasks
Contrast Name Human > Primate Human > Dog
ROI label t-stat pFDR 95% CI t-stat pFDR 95% CI
Explicit Task: HumanEmotion>Expression > Non-humanEmotion>Expression
LOFC 0.156 1.000 0.22 0.17 1.038 0.877 0.42 0.12
TPJ 1.862 0.343 0.27 0.01 1.102 0.877 0.35 0.10
aSTS 2.013 0.343 0.01 0.17 0.629 1.000 0.08 0.16
dmPFC 1.157 0.741 0.25 0.05 1.401 0.877 0.44 0.07
Explicit Task: HumanEmotionþExpression > Non-humanEmotionþExpression
LOFC 0.380 1.477 0.08 0.14 0.543 1.335 0.06 0.10
TPJ 4.469 0.002 0.11 0.29 0.851 1.335 0.04 0.12
aSTS* 5.352 0.001 0.12 0.24 3.659 0.021 0.06 0.20
dmPFC 2.971 0.026 0.05 0.22 0.476 1.335 0.07 0.12
Implicit Task: Human > Non-human
LOFC 0.256 1.000 0.08 0.06 1.077 0.620 0.04 0.11
TPJ 2.257 0.160 0.01 0.11 3.002 0.070 0.03 0.13
aSTS 4.334 0.004 0.03 0.08 2.667 0.070 0.01 0.11
dmPFC 0.372 1.000 0.03 0.06 1.789 0.257 0.02 0.13
*ROIs showing effects in both non-human targets. P-values are adjusted for mul-
tiple ROIs using a FDR procedure. Further details on ROIs are provided in the
main text and Supplementary Table S1. L, Left; LOFC, lateral orbitofrontal cortex;
TPJ, temporoparietal junction; aSTS, anterior superior temporal sulcus; dmPFC,
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex.
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we consider this possibility unlikely, it could arise from separate
but intermingled populations of neurons within the same brain
regions. Future fMRI studies using multivoxel analyses or adap-
tation protocols could further test this possibility, as could
single-unit recordings from neurosurgical patients (although
with the exception of dmPFC, the regions we found are rarely
implanted with electrodes).
We used a novel adaptation of the Yes/No Why/How Task
(Spunt and dolphs, 2014) to examine the neural basis of a com-
mon form of anthropomorphism, namely, the attribution of
complex emotional states to the facial expressions of non-
human animals. By comparing such attributions to those made
about the facial expressions of humans, we were able to show
that the attribution of emotion to non-human animals relies on
the same executive processes already known to be critical for
understanding the behavior other humans in terms of mental
states (Spunt et al., 2011; Spunt and Lieberman, 2012a), and is
consistent with our recent work suggesting that these processes
can be flexibly deployed to understand the reasons for phenom-
ena in non-social domains (Spunt and Adolphs, 2015). Thus,
attribution of emotion to non-human animals may represent
one of the many possible expansions humans have made on
their capacity to reason about the causes of human behavior.
More broadly and in the spirit of Darwin’s seminal treatise on
human and non-human animal emotion, our findings here fur-
ther encourage a non-anthropocentric view of emotion under-
standing, one that treats the idea that animals have emotions
as no more gratuitous than the idea that humans other than
ourselves do.
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